UnitasProtocol V1

Rating

BBB

Score69.00

Stablecoin

Sec. Infrastructure Overview

Current Bug Bounty:

No Bug Bounty

Bug Bounty Max Payout: 0 $

Has paid White Hats before:

Date of Last Audit: 1 Jan 1

Recent Security Incidents

Incident
Amount Lost
Date

Secured By

The Protocol is secured by

Name
Type
Website
0
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Past Audits

Number of Audits

1

Number of Vul. Found

7

Date of Last Audit

1 Jan 1

Past Audit Reports

Last codebase change was on: 1 Jan 1

Company
Date
Number of Vul Found
Link
1 Jan 1
0
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Show all Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities reported in past audits

Severity
Title
Location
Link
REDUCTED
REDUCTED
REDUCTED
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Code Structure

Lines of Code

0

Amount of Contracts

26

External Integrations

0 Code Summery

Unitas DeFi Protocol aims to create a new category of stablecoins known as unitized stablecoins, which represent emerging market currencies and enhance financial inclusion. These stablecoins are decentralized and over-reserved with USD stablecoins, ensuring that holding a Unitas stablecoin equates to holding a specific amount of USD stablecoin. For instance, a Unitas Indian Rupee stablecoin is pegged to the value of USD stablecoin based on current exchange rates. The protocol guarantees unconditional convertibility back to USD stablecoins, and in the event of a decrease in over-reserve, it can execute a global settlement to protect users. By facilitating foreign investment and cross-border payments, Unitas aims to empower emerging market businesses and integrate them into the global financial system.

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Code Structure & Dependency

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Centralization

Decentralization Score

13 out of 20

Contract Upgradability

No upgradability

Frontend

Go to Dapp

Maintenance Score

2.00

Poor

Excellent

Admin / Governance Functions

Timelocks

Uses Timelocks

Pauseability

Can be paused

Admin Wallet

Admins can mint, burn, withdraw stablecoins

Can be paused

Timelock on sensitive functions i.e Mint, Burn

Recommendations

OpenZeppelin #4154 Fix TransparentUpgradeableProxy'ransparency Risk: very low. In Xoracle, there is no milliseconds check, so potential can bypass the require(prev_timestamp < timestamp, "Outdated timestamp"); and update the price on the same date. If the frontend fetches the timestamp of price updates, it will only lead to confusion. Risk: very low. When users are performing a swap, if they encounter an Oracle price update within the same block, they may exchange at a different price than originally expected. Our Oracle price feeder does not have a fixed update time, but the chances of encountering this situation are very low. We plan to implement checks in phase 2 to address this. Risk: very low.

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